This paper uses daily market value data on credit default swap spreads and intra-day stock prices to measure systemic risk in the insurance sector. Using the systemic risk measure, we examine the inter-connectedness between banks and insurers with Granger causality tests. Based on linear and non-linear causality tests, we find evidence of significant bidirectional causality between insurers and banks. However, after correcting for conditional heteroskedasticity, the impact of banks on insurers is stronger and of longer duration than the impact of insurers on banks. Stress tests confirm that banks create significant systemic risk for insurers but not vice versa.
Introduction
Systemic risk is often triggered by financial institutions that are too-big-to-fail or toointerconnected-to fail. From a statistical perspective, systemic risk involves the co-movement of key financial variables measuring the health or stability of financial institutions; it has also been described as the potential for multiple simultaneous defaults of major financial institutions.
Traditional measures such as correlation coefficients generally are not adequate to measure systemic risk because systemic risk tends to involve tail-behavior, which is not captured by conventional measures. Conventional measures also rely on balance sheet or accounting information that is only available on a relatively low-frequency basis and often with a lag.
There is a growing literature on systemic risk in banking, as banks have long been known to be a source of systemic risk. However, little research has been conducted on measuring systemic risk in the insurance industry. 1 In the past, researchers argued that insurers were not systemically risky because they lacked the "special character" of banks, primarily the susceptibility to bank runs due to the liquidity of bank deposits (Swiss Re, 2003) . However the near-collapse and government bailout of American International Group (AIG) has challenged this traditional view of insurance.
Two prior papers measure systemic risk in banking and insurance using market data. Billio et al. (2010) propose several econometric measures of systemic risk to capture the interconnectedness among the monthly stock returns of hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurance companies based on principal component analysis and linear Granger causality tests. They find that all four sectors have become highly inter-related over the past decade, increasing the level of 1 There have been several studies of systemic risk in insurance using aggregate data or a case study approach. Swiss Re (2003) and the Group of Thirty (2006) conclude that the reinsurance industry is not a significant source of systemic risk. Harrington (2009) analyzes the role of AIG in the 2007-2009 financial crisis and concludes that systemic risk is relatively low in insurance markets. Weiss (2010) and Cummins and Weiss (2010) argue that the core activities of insurers are not a significant source of systemic risk but that banking functions such as derivatives trading are potential sources of systemic risk. Similar conclusions are supported in Geneva Association (2010) .
systemic risk in the finance and insurance industries. Acharya et al. (2010) model systemic risk using daily stock price data. An institution's contribution to systemic risk, denoted systemic expected shortfall (SES), is its propensity to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is undercapitalized. They provide empirical evidence of the ability of SES to predict emerging systemic risk during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. This paper adds to the sparse information on the interconnectedness of the banking and insurance industries. The purpose of the paper is to create and implement a robust systemic risk measure for the insurance sector and investigate the interconnectedness between the banking and insurance industries during the financial crisis using this measure. The systemic risk measure is based on Huang et al. (2009) and relies on daily-frequency market data on credit default swap (CDS) spreads as well as intra-day trading data on stock prices. 2 This measure is risk-neutral, forward-looking and economically intuitive. Also, the direction of any interconnectedness found between banking and insurance is investigated using linear and non-linear Granger causality tests, providing information on whether the insurance industry is the source or victim of systemic risk.
By way of preview, we find linear and non-linear causal effects between systemic risk measures of banks and insurers in both directions. However, heteroskedasticity is present in the data. After adjusting for heteroskedasticity and reconducting the Granger tests, the impact of banks on insurers is found to be stronger and of longer duration than the impact of insurers on banks. Further, stress testing indicates that banks create significant systemic risk for insurers but not vice versa. Thus, the results overall largely indicate that insurers are victims rather than propagators of systemic risk.
This research contributes to the literature as being the first paper to utilize data on CDS spreads and intra-day stock prices to study systemic risk in the insurance industry. Also, we utilize a different econometric methodology than Acharya et al. (2010) or Billio et al. (2010) to estimate systemic risk. Thus, the paper provides new information on whether insurers are sources or victims of systemic risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly outline the distress insurance premium (DIP) approach proposed by Huang et al. (2009) . We then discuss the linear and nonlinear Granger causality tests in Section 3. Section 4 describes our data and presents results from our analyses on CDS spreads and probabilities of default. In Section 5, we study inter-relationships between the insurance and banking industries and conduct stress testing to investigate the inter-sector impact of economics. Section 6 concludes.
Measuring Systemic Risk
In this paper, we estimate a forward-looking, risk neutral measure of systemic risk in the insurance industry. Huang et al. (2009) use this measure to examine systemic risk in the banking sector. In order to derive the systemic risk measure, we need to estimate the two major components that determine the risk profile of our sample portfolio of insurers. The first component is the probability of default for each insurer. The second component is default correlation, which can be estimated indirectly from the underlying equity return correlation.
These two risk components are estimated using data on CDS premiums and intra-day stock prices. Next, we implement our measure of systemic risk utilizing a portfolio credit risk methodology. The remainder of this section discusses estimation of the risk neutral probability of default and of asset return correlations. This is followed by an explanation of the construction of a forward-looking risk-neutral indicator of systemic risk for the insurance industry.
Risk-Neutral Probability of Default
The probability of default is estimated for each insurer in the portfolio using data on CDS . PD i,t is a risk-neutral measure since it reflects not only the actual default probability but also a risk premium component. It is forward-looking as well, i.e., it reflects the average risk-neutral probability of default of the underlying entity during the contract period.
Asset Return Correlations
The other key dimension of portfolio credit risk is default correlation, which can be estimated indirectly from the underlying asset return correlation (Hull and White, 2004; Huang et al., 2009 ). Since equity is a call option on underlying firm assets, the co-movement in equity prices tends to reflect the co-movement among underlying asset values. Equity returns are advantageous because they are observed frequently; thus, changes in the default correlations between institutions will be immediately reflected in their stock price movements.
We utilize data on intra-day stock prices (tick-by-tick data) in order to compute correlations over relatively short time horizons. Our high frequency stock price data come from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. As in Andersen et al. (2003) 
where r i, j k and r i, j l are the j-th return (j=1,…,M) in the i-th period for stocks k and l, respectively.
The realized correlations are then used to forecast asset return correlations, the measure of portfolio credit risk: 
A Measure of Systemic Risk
We can estimate a forward-looking, risk-neutral indicator of the systemic risk of the insurance industry -the price of insurance against financial distress, based on the two risk components derived above. We construct a hypothetical debt portfolio that consists of total liabilities of the sample insurers. We define financial distress by choosing a threshold (for example, 15%) such that the ratio of portfolio credit losses to total liabilities of the insurance sector is equal to or above the threshold.
Suppose we have N insurers in the portfolio. Following Tarashev and Zhu (2008), we use a Monte Carlo simulation procedure to create the systemic risk measure.
(1) Generate N random samples x 0 from independent standard normal distribution.
(2) Calculate x = R' x 0 , where R denotes the Cholesky factor of the asset return correlation matrix for the N insurers. If x i < Φ −1 (PD i,t ), then insurer i is said to default.
(3) Repeat the above steps 10,000 times to estimate the probability of joint defaults Pr(nd = k) where nd is the number of defaults and k=1, 2, . . . , N.
(4) For a given k, we simulate the realizations of loss-given-defaults (LGD) assuming a symmetric triangular distribution for 10,000 times and calculate the conditional loss distribution Pr(L | nd = k).
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(5) We conduct the above exercise for k=1, 2, . . . , N and then compute the unconditional probability distribution of the portfolio credit losses
(6) The systemic risk measure is calculated as the risk-neutral expectation of portfolio credit losses that reach at least a minimum share (e.g., 15%) of the sector's total liability.
where SR t INS is the systemic risk measure for the insurance industry, L t denotes the portfolio credit losses, and TL t represents the total liability of the insurance sector at time t.
An important advantage of this method is that it does not require a large sample of firms.
Huang et al. (2009) were able to conduct the analysis and obtain very interesting results using only twelve banks. Since only major insurers have traded CDS, this study's conclusions would apply most directly to relatively large firms. In comparing default probabilities for insurers of varying size, it should be noted that large insurers are known to have lower insurance obligation default risk than smaller insurers (Cummins, 2009 ). However, the systemic risk measure should largely reflect default risk associated with insurers' financial debt at the holding company level rather than insurance obligation default risk at the subsidiary level. Smaller insurers are less engaged in debt issuance activities, making the debt default probabilities greater for larger insurers. Such default risk is measured by these CDS quotes. Although our sample consists of only larger insurers, they represent the most relevant group for our purposes because systemic events tend to originate from large institutions.
A similar estimation procedure is performed for the firms in the banking sector, resulting 6 The assumption of symmetric triangle distribution enhances the computational efficiency but is not essential to the results. Huang et al. (2009) 
Next, the autoregression is augmented by including lagged values of t X with an optimal number of lags q , also determined through BIC:
The null hypothesis that t X does not Granger- 
Nonlinear Granger Causality Test
The linear Granger causality test cannot capture nonlinear and higher-order causal relationships. However, we are also interested in the question of whether an increase in riskiness in one financial sector leads to an increase in the riskiness of another. To capture any potential higher-order effects, we consider a nonlinear Granger-causality test.
The general test for nonlinear Granger causality was first developed by Baek and Brock (1992) , and later modified by Hiemstra and Jones (1994) . To examine the nonlinear Granger causality relationship between a pair of series, one has to first apply the linear models to identify their linear causal relationships and obtain their corresponding residuals. Thereafter, one applies a nonlinear Granger test to the residual series. In this paper, we adopt the Hiemstra-Jones (HJ) statistics for the nonlinear causality test. Diks and Panchenko (2006) argue that under certain variance conditions, the HJ statistic could over-reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality.
As a robustness check, we also employ the Diks-Panchenko (DP) statistics. Details of the HJ test statistics and DJ test statistics are provided in the Appendix.
Data and Systemic Risk Measures
Credit default swaps (CDS) are unique financial instruments that mimic the payoff structure of an insurance policy. In CDS contracts, certain debt obligations of a particular company, known as the reference entity, are the underlying asset. A CDS seller provides protection to a buyer against the default of these debt obligations. The CDS buyer does not need to have an insurable interest in the reference entity to purchase this coverage. The CDS buyer pays a spread periodically to the seller. If the reference entity defaults, the CDS seller agrees to compensate the buyer the face amount of the contract, depending on the nature of the default.
Thus, this transaction allows the buyer and seller to diversify their portfolios; and the reference entity can observe how the market prices its default risk.
Data
The CDS quotes are obtained from Markit. As the quote data show, CDS could be created for a variety of possible contractual combinations, including tier, contract duration, and restructuring clause. The restructuring clause for a CDS defines what constitutes a defaulttriggering payment. 7 Markit also classifies each reference entity under an industry classification.
We obtain CDS quotes for all companies listed under the "Financials" classification; this sector includes banking, insurance, and other financial firms. We check each firm's Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) main code, limiting our sample to banks and insurers. 8 We then determine whether each firm is publicly traded on a U.S. exchange. These criteria identify 92 Table 1 lists these companies.
[ Table 1 about here]
These firms are among the largest publicly traded companies in each of these industry sectors; correspondingly, their heavy CDS quote activity allows us to construct our systemic risk measure. 10 Descriptive statistics about these 5-year spreads for each firm are presented in Table   2 .
[ Table 2 about here]
Equity price data for each of the sample companies is obtained from TAQ; prices at 30-minute intervals are used to construct a time series for each week. Focusing on our insurance firms, we calculate realized weekly equity correlations between each pair of companies in this sector. We then calculate an average equity return correlation for insurers by averaging across all relevant firms. This same procedure is then followed for the banking firms. [ Figure 1 about here] 9 The main SIC codes among these 11 insurers are 6311, 6330, 6331, and 6351 and the main SIC codes among these 22 banks are 6021, 6022, 6029, 6035, 6141, 6211, and 6282. 10 We require Friday 5-year, senior, no restructuring quotes to build our time series. However, for several firms, this data is incomplete. For a firm that is missing this exact quote on a particular Friday, we investigate whether the firm had another 5-year, senior quote that day for a different restructuring clause. If it does, we use a Markit-provided conversion ratio to convert that quote to a no restructuring quote. If there are no other 5-year, senior quotes on that particular Friday, we search the relevant 5-year, senior quotes on the preceding Thursday, first looking for a no restructuring quote and, if that is missing, then a different restructuring clause for which we then convert. That procedure repeats to Wednesday, Tuesday, and then Monday if needed to find a replacement quote. If no potential replacement quote is found, then linear interpolation is used between observed Friday quotes to fill in missing values.
We also retrieve a list of macro-economic variables that reflect the general condition of (2011) and is calculated as the ratio of net written premiums to private sector GDP. Wang et al. (2011) argue that this annual measure, which they term Total Premium Share, is a "key driver" of the property-liability underwriting cycle. Of the 11 insurers, 8 are classified as property-liability firms. Of the remaining three, Lincoln National had only life-health operations, and MetLife has property-liability operations in their financial group. While Prudential has divested itself of its property-liability companies, it did own these operations for the beginning part of our sample time period. Thus, given the predominance of firms in our sample that may be affected by the underwriting cycle, we include this variable in our regression analysis for the insurance group. Table 3 presents the summary statistics for all these macro-economic variables.
[ Table 3 about here]
Probability of Default
We estimate the probability of default for each firm using equation (2); as our focus is on 5-year CDS spreads, our risk-free rate is the 5-year Treasury rate in effect for each week, obtained from the Federal Reserve. Figure 2a depicts the average probability of default over our time period for each industry sector; in Figure 2b , these average probabilities are weighted by the total liabilities for each firm, which are obtained from COMPUSTAT. In both comparisons, the average probability of default is greater for insurers in the early years of our sample period.
However, from 2007 onwards, insurers and banks have similar probabilities of default, spiking at 13 various points as the financial crisis began.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Forecasting Asset Return Correlations
These average weekly equity return correlations are used in the time series regression in Equation (4) to estimate the forecasted return correlations. Several regressions are run to determine the best fit for these correlation forecasts. Table 4 presents our results for the insurance firms. Among our independent variables are the average weekly equity return correlations lagged one-week and one-quarter. While those variables separately and jointly are significant predictors of the weekly equity correlation one quarter ahead, as shown in models (1), (2), and (3), the explanatory power is boosted with the addition of the macro variables and the variable, Cycle. Comparing the different specifications, we consider Model (5) to have the best fit; this model is used to forecast the quarterly asset return correlations for the insurance sector.
[ Table 4 about here]
Similarly, in Table 5 , we present several models explaining return correlations for the banking sector. While other analyses were performed, we report only those models whose sets of independent variables mimic those presented above in the insurance analysis for comparison purposes. Just as for the insurance firms, the impact of the realized correlation lagged onequarter is a significant indicator of the future correlation; we use Model (4) to forecast correlations in the banking sector.
[ Table 5 about here]
Systemic Risk Measure
Following the methodology presented in Section 2.3 and with the inputs detailed above, we compute the systemic risk measures for each week during the period June 2002 through May
2008. This measure represents a weekly price of insurance against distressed losses over the following three months. Figure 3a illustrates the dynamics of the systemic risk measures in nominal prices for each sector. It is not surprising that the nominal price in the banking sector always lies above that in the insurance sector, since the portfolio of our sample banks has a much larger total liability and therefore requires a higher price for insurance. In order to compare systemic risk between these two sectors on a common scale, we calculate the unit price of insurance that is defined as the ratio of the nominal price to total liabilities of our sample firms in each sector.
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We focus on the systemic risk measures in unit price in the following analysis. As can be seen from Figure 3b , these unit price measures are highly correlated. The correlation coefficient is 0.8529 for the whole sample period and 0.9526 for the market downturn period (2007) (2008) .
In the early part of the sample time period, the unit price curves do not deviate from each other by a large magnitude, though the unit price for the insurance sector is slightly greater than that for the banking sector. However through the years 2007 and 2008, there is consistent movement in this indicator across industries and as depicted by the spikes in unit price at various points, systemic risk for the banking industry dominates that for insurance.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Inter-Connectedness between the Banking and Insurance Sectors
In this section, we focus on the inter-connectedness between the banking and insurance sectors during the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . One question that is frequently asked is whether insurers contribute to systemic risk or whether they are potential victims of systemic risk; thus, we need to examine the issue of causality. The causality test investigates whether lagged values of a particular variable are significant in terms of the prediction model on another variable.
Results of Linear Granger Causality Tests on Systemic Risk Measures
It is clear from Figure 3b that Table 6 .
[ Figure 4 about here]
[ 
Results of Linear Causality Tests on Input Data Series
In this subsection, we perform the linear Granger causality tests using the underlying input data on CDS spreads and stock returns. Particularly, we test whether bank CDS spreads (stock returns) Granger cause insurer CDS spreads (stock returns), and vice versa. Such evidence could provide inference that our results are attributable to the underlying data rather than the methods we use to derive the systemic risk measure.
We create weekly data series of average (equally weighted) CDS spreads for banks and insurers, respectively. 13 The ADF test fails to reject the null hypothesis that a unit root exists.
We then take the first difference on the average CDS spreads to make it stationary. The ADF test then rejects the unit root hypothesis. Working with the first difference of CDS spreads, we find bi-directional causality relationships between bank CDS spreads and insurer CDS spreads. We follow the same procedure to test if any causality relationship exists on the average stock returns for banks and insurers. The average stock returns are stationary. No causal effect is found in either direction between average stock returns for banks and that for insurers. These test results are summarized in Table 7 .
[ Table 7 about here]
It is not surprising that we observe a similar pattern on CDS quotes to that on the systemic risk measure since CDS quotes essentially imply the probability of default, one 13 As a robust check, we perform causality tests on liability weighted CDS spreads and obtain similar results.
important variable used to compute the systemic risk measure. While we do not observe Granger causality for insurer and bank mean stock returns, this does not negate the bi-directional causality findings using the systemic risk measure. Mean returns provide a snapshot of how well a portfolio performed but tend to obscure relationships among individual stocks included in the portfolio. 14 In our systemic risk measure, however, we utilize the strength of the interrelationships among firms within a portfolio.
Results of Nonlinear Granger Causality Tests on Systemic Risk Measures
Now we focus on the systemic risk measure and conduct the nonlinear causality test. We use the residuals from the linear autoregressive model so that any linear predictive power has been removed and any remaining incremental predictive power of one residual series for another can be considered nonlinear. Before testing for nonlinear Granger causality, we first perform a nonlinear dependence test known as the Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman (BDS) test, to investigate whether these two residual series are characterized by nonlinearities Scheinkman, 1987 and Brock et al., 1996) . When applied to the residuals from a fitted linear time series model, the BDS test can be used to detect any remaining dependence and the presence of an omitted nonlinear structure. Results of the BDS tests, reported in Table 8, reveal that the vast majority of the estimates of the BDS statistics are statistically significant, indicating nonlinearities in the univariate systemic risk measure for both the banking and insurance sectors.
[ Table 8 about here]
To compute the HJ statistic, values for the lead length m , the lag lengths x L and y L and the distance measure e must be selected. In contrast to linear causality testing, no methods have 14 We do perform Granger causality tests examining the impact of the mean bank (insurer) portfolio return on each individual insurer (bank) return. We find that, at the 1% significance level, the mean bank portfolio return Granger causes the individual insurer stock return for only 2 of the 11 insurers (AIG and SAFECO), and the mean insurer portfolio return Granger causes the individual bank return for only 4 out of 22 banks (American Express, BB&T Corporation, Bear Stearns and Morgan Stanley).
been developed for choosing optimal values for lag lengths and the distance measure. Following Hiemstra and Jones (1994), we set the lead length at 1 = m , and set y x L L = , using common lag lengths of 1 to 8 lags. In addition, we standardize each series of the systemic risk measure so that a common distance, e.g., 5 . 1 = e , can be applied to both series. The results of the HJ test can be found in Table 9 .
[ Table 9 about here] Panel A of Table 9 reports the results when we include the full sample of insurers.
Focusing on the HJ statistics, the null hypothesis of no nonlinear Granger causality from the systemic risk of insurers to that of banks can be rejected at a 5 percent significance level for seven lags. The null hypothesis of no nonlinear Granger causality from the systemic risk of banks to that of insurers can also be rejected at a 10 percent significance level within eight lags.
At fewer lags, the significance becomes stronger, recognizing the influential flow of information across these two industries over a shorter period of time.
Also reported in Table 9 are the results from implementing the DP test for analyzing nonlinear causal effects. Focusing on Panel A, with the full set of insurers, we find levels of significance comparable to that found under the HJ metric, with a similar significant number of lags in each direction. In Panel B, where AIG is excluded from the analysis, the impact of insurers on banks appears statistically stronger than that of banks on insurers, with an impact through eight lags. When examining the results for the analysis of the banks' systemic risk impact on insurers, we observe significance through three lags under both methodologies. Using the HJ statistic, we do find several additional weakly significant lags. Combining our observations about these analyses, we find evidence of bidirectional nonlinear Granger causality between systemic risk measures of banks and insurers.
Control for Conditional Heteroskedasticity
conditional heteroskedasticity exists in our data, the results presented above could be biased.
Indeed, given the financial data used in the analysis, we may expect volatility clustering over time. To investigate this further, we examine the residual series that we obtained from the regression models for linear Granger causality tests. We observe little autocorrelation in the residuals but there exists conditional heteroskedasticity. Figure 5A depicts the values of autocorrelation functions (ACF) of the squared residuals for various lags in the insurance regression; the horizontal lines represent the 95% confidence interval. 15 It is clear that the ACF of the squared returns indicates significant correlation and persistence in the second-order moments. 16 To control for this, we keep the conditional mean model and add a conditional variance model to fit the data. After incorporating the GARCH (1,1) model, we analyze the residuals again and find that the sample ACFs of the resulting squared standardized errors fall in the 95% confidence interval, as depicted in Figure 5B . This indicates that our model sufficiently accounts for ARCH effects; the Q-test and ARCH tests further confirm these results.
[ Figure 5 about here]
We then perform the linear and nonlinear Granger tests again using the GARCH fitting.
As AIG does not have a demonstrable effect on our previous results, we show the analyses that incorporate the full set of insurers. As reported in Panel A of Table 10 , the model that tests for the influence of insurers on banks loses its significance. There is a unidirectional linear causal effect from the systemic risk measure of banks on insurers. In Panel B, which reports nonlinear effects, we observe a similar change in results. While the nonlinear effect of insurers on banks is highly significant at one lag, that significance fades after lag 3. This is in contrast to the banks 15 The ACFs in the bank regression have similar patterns. 16 We also perform The Ljung-Box Q-test and ARCH test for serial autocorrelation and ARCH effects. The Q-test on the residuals fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to 10 lags. However, the Q-test on the squared residuals and ARCH tests indicate the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity in our data.
having a persistent predictive power on insurers up to five lags. To summarize, the systemic risk of banks has a longer duration of impact on insurers.
[ Table 10 about here]
Stress Testing
To further evaluate the effects we observe in the above analyses, we perform stress testing exercises. Under a hypothetical scenario, a 5% shock in systemic risk of the banking sector is fed into the GARCH regression models to generate future dynamic movement of systemic risk in the banking and insurance industries. The goal of this stress testing exercise is to study the degree of impact of systemic risk movements in the banking sector on that in the insurance sector and then vice versa. We first simulate 10,000 paths of the systemic risk measure in the insurance sector in the future twelve weeks, assuming there is no shock in the banking sector. We then do the same by assuming a 5% shock in the systemic risk in the banking sector.
We compute the percentage increase in systemic risk in the insurance sector for the future 12 weeks given this 5% shock. Shocks of 10%, 15%, and 20% are also applied.
[ Table 11 about here] Table 11 presents the results from these various scenarios. In Panel A, which reports the percentage increases in systemic risk for insurers after a systemic risk shock from banks, we observe a persistent effect through the following 12 week period. While an immediate effect is not observed, starting in week 2 and afterwards, this shock ripples through the insurance sector.
Under this stress testing exercise, a 20% shock in the banking system leads to a 11% shock in the insurance system. In Panel B, this stress testing is performed in the opposite direction; various shocks are applied to the insurance sector to observe its effect on banks. As shown, these effects are negligible. The results from this stress testing performed in both directions further reinforces our final results from the GARCH nonlinear causality tests which indicate a stronger influence of banks on insurers than for insurers on banks.
Conclusions
This paper uses data on credit default swaps spreads and high frequency intra-day stock prices to develop a measure of systemic risk for the insurance and banking industries. This is the first study to use CDS data and intra-day stock prices to construct a systemic risk measure for the insurance industry. Among the benefits of this systemic risk metric are that it is risk-neutral and forward looking.
Linear and nonlinear Granger causality tests are conducted on the systemic risk measure to determine whether insurers Granger cause systemic risk in banks and vice versa. When no controls for heteroskedasticity are included in the data, we find strong evidence of bidirectional
Granger causality between systemic risk measures of banks and insurers, both linearly and nonlinearly. However, the results above could be biased if conditional heteroskedasticity exists in the data. The residual series from the regression models obtained for the linear Granger causality tests indicates that conditional heteroskedasticity is present. Thus, the linear and nonlinear Granger tests are conducted again using a GARCH (1,1) model. The linear model that tests for the influence of insurers on banks loses its significance. The nonlinear effect of insurers on banks is highly significant at one lag, but that significance fades after lag 3. This is in contrast to the result for banks that indicates that banks have persistent predictive power on insurers. Thus, the systemic risk of banks has a longer duration of impact on insurers.
To obtain a better idea of the economic significance of the results obtained, stress testing is conducted. In this stress testing exercise, a 20% shock in the banking system leads to a 11% shock in the insurance system. When tests are performed in the opposite direction, the effects of a shock from insurers on banks are negligible. Thus, the stress test results confirm the results from the nonlinear Granger causality tests that banks have a much stronger influence on insurers than insurers have on banks.
These results are mostly consistent with the notion that insurers tend to be victims of systemic risk rather than instigators. This result is especially important given that the sample of insurers analyzed consists of large, international firms which engage in activities other than insurance (e.g., banking-like activities). Future research will consider how much of the increase in the distress insurance premium was due to the actual default probability of these firms and how much was due to general market overreaction to events across financial industries. In addition, we will study how much each of these major insurers contributes to the overall systemic risk in the industry. This will complement work by Huang et al. (2011a, b) , which investigates and examines this decomposition in the banking industry.
The results of this study indicate that public policy makers and bank regulators should spend their time dealing with how to prevent and/or ameliorate the effects of systemic shocks on the economy from banks. It also suggests that systemic risk regulators should focus on the banking rather than the insurance activities of large insurers. Insurance regulators should focus on tangible ways to mitigate the effects on insurers of economic shocks from the banking system.
Mitigation measures might include investment restrictions and tighter capital requirements.
Further work is needed to determine the transmission mechanisms through which banking shocks are transmitted to insurers in order to inform managers and regulators of how to avoid and mitigate systemic risk. Note: Term spread is defined as the difference between the 10-year and 3-month constant maturity Treasury rates. Cycle is defined as the ratio of annual net premiums written in the US property-liability insurance industry to the U.S. private sector GDP. Note: The dependent variable is the one-week realized correlation at time t+12. Fisher's transformations is applied to the return correlations. Cycle is defined as the ratio of annual net premiums written in the US property-liability insurance industry to U.S. private sector GDP. SP500 Return is the one-week return on the S&P 500 Index. VIX represents the implied volatility on the S&P 500 Index. Fed Funds Rate is the 5-year constant maturity Treasury Rate. Term is defined as the difference between the 10-year and 3-month constant maturity Treasury rates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * (**, or ***) denotes significance at the 10% (5% or 1%) level. Note: The dependent variable is the one-week realized correlation at time t+12. Fisher's transformation is applied to the return correlations. SP500 Return is the one-week return on the S&P 500 Index. VIX represents the implied volatility on the S&P 500 Index. Fed Funds Rate is the 5-year constant maturity Treasury Rate. Term is defined as the difference between the 10-year and 3-month constant maturity Treasury rates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * (**, or ***) denotes significance at the 10% (5% or 1%) level. 1% critical values are reported in parentheses. L B and L I denotes the number of lags for average CDS spreads/average stock returns in banking and insurance sectors, respectively. * (**, or ***) denotes significance at the 10% (5% or 1%) level. Hiemstra and Jones (1994) methodology; DP statistic uses Diks and Panchenko (2006) methodology. p-values are shown in the parentheses. * (**, or ***) denotes significance at the 10% (5% or 1%) level. Hiemstra and Jones (1994) methodology; DP statistic uses Diks and Panchenko (2006) methodology. p-values are shown in the parentheses. * (**, or ***) denotes significance at the 10% (5% or 1%) level. Shock  T=1  T=2  T=3  T=4  T=5  T=6  T=7  T=8  T=9  T=10  T=11  T=12  5% 0 Shock  T=1  T=2  T=3  T=4  T=5  T=6  T=7  T=8  T=9  T=10  T=11  T=12 
. The m-length lead vector and the y Llength lag vector of { } t Y can be defined similarly. According to Baek and Brock (1992) 
Diks-Panchenko (DP) Test Statistics
To further investigate this nonlinear relationship and as a robustness check, we also employ the methodology presented in Diks and Panchenko (2006) . These authors argue that under certain variance conditions, the HJ statistic could over-reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality. Diks and Panchenko (2006) propose their own nonparametric measure for testing for nonlinear causality.
Under the strict stationarity of { } 
